The Schengen Area is Changing: Free Movement Gives Way to a Security Focus, Says Markéta Votoupalová

With its 40th anniversary, the Schengen Area is undergoing an unprecedented test. Since the migration waves of 2015 and 2016, politicians and the media have constantly spoken of a “crisis” and the looming collapse of the free movement system. However, a recent study by Markéta Votoupalová from the Department of International and Diplomatic Studies at FIR VŠE, published in the prestigious Journal of European Integration, presents a different, much more nuanced picture. What is actually happening with the borderless Europe project? Are we facing permanent controls? The author of the study provides the answers.

Does the current situation mean the era of taking borderless travel for granted is definitively over?

First, it needs to be said that free movement in Europe has never been absolute. Debates about its pitfalls and limitations have been ongoing since the very beginning of Schengen cooperation in the mid-1980s, and especially since the 1990s when the project was legislatively incorporated into the EU. Member states have always had the option to reimpose internal border controls, whether temporarily or as ad hoc police checks. However, the introduction of these measures was always subject to detailed rules.

When did the major turning point occur that led to the massive return of controls?

A crisis that highlighted the arbitrariness of internal reimpositions was the 2011 dispute between Italy and France over refugees arriving from North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring. Although member states lobbied for more leeway at the national level at that time, the EU responded by strengthening its own oversight and shifting the focus to the robust protection of external borders. The logic was clear: the better the external controls, the fewer we will need internally.

This trend, supported by amendments to the Schengen Borders Code, continues today. However, the result is a paradoxical situation. While the Union has various monitoring mechanisms at its disposal, its actual ability to compel states to lift internal controls is highly limited.

So, are member states effectively circumventing European rules?

Member states are exploiting the legislative options to the fullest, including interpreting them very loosely—and they are essentially getting away with it. The selected countries I analysed in my research have maintained controls on parts of their borders for over 10 years. In my view, this cannot be justified under current legislation, even with the best of intentions. While the European Commission and the European Parliament criticise this, not a single infringement procedure has practically been launched. This points to a tacit agreement with the situation. The status quo of numerous reimposed internal controls has simply become the reality. Schengen is changing, both symbolically and practically, into a security project.

“The status quo of numerous reimposed internal controls has simply become the reality. Schengen is changing, both symbolically and factually, into a security project.”

One set of rules, differing interpretations

Previous research has primarily focused on the bureaucratic mechanisms between member states and the European Commission. You, however, focused on how politicians publicly justify these controls, analysing six specific states. Why this particular group?

I analysed Germany, Austria, France, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. It made sense to examine the discourse of states that have maintained internal border controls for over 10 years, despite the Code officially permitting them for a maximum of two to three years. To understand the future of integration, it is crucial to examine how politicians justify these measures to their own citizens. Research shows that this directly shapes their real political actions within the EU. From a practical standpoint, it also helped that I speak the languages of these countries. What is fascinating is that while these selected states are essentially doing the same thing, their justifications are completely different.

In your article, you demonstrate that the states’ approaches to borders differ radically. Could you explain the contrast between the Scandinavian and continental European approaches?

What struck me most was the difference between Germany and Austria, perhaps even more than the difference between these countries and Scandinavia. Even though they are neighbours, their rhetoric differs fundamentally. Germany, which has the most extensive controls of all the countries (at the end of the analysed period, it even had them on all its borders, which is truly unprecedented), presents them very cautiously, almost apologetically, as a temporary and exceptional measure to be lifted as soon as the EU’s external borders are better protected. German politicians also openly admit that the controls are costly and understaffed.

And how does Austria react?

Austria is much bolder and more assertive. It explicitly blames other states for the controls and ostentatiously emphasizes that it is unwilling to bear a larger burden than others. For Vienna, controls are simply a legitimate instrument to balance out what they perceive as a failure of Schengen externally. So, while both countries see the root cause at the external borders, their subsequent arguments are completely different.

And what about Denmark?

There, some politicians from mainstream governing parties view permanent controls within Schengen as something that is actually consistent with its functioning. This is a completely unprecedented defence, and experts agree that it contradicts the very purpose of free movement. Usually, this argument is employed by the far right calling for a withdrawal, but in Denmark, this approach has entered the mainstream political discourse. It was advocated, for example, by the former Danish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

“While Germany presents the controls almost apologetically, Austria explicitly blames others, and Danish politicians view permanent borders as compatible with the functioning of Schengen.”

Modern Technology as a Replacement for Boom Barriers?

In July 2024, new rules for the Schengen Code came into effect, aiming to regulate internal controls more strictly and cap them with time limits. What impact will this have?

I believe the new rules won’t fundamentally change anything. While they attempt to regulate the introduction of controls more closely, the legislation still leaves enormous room for the member states’ discretion. Furthermore, a loophole remains allowing controls to be kept essentially indefinitely—it is possible to reimpose them if a new threat emerges. And since this extension is only reported by a letter to the Commission, it’s “convenient” to simply state a different threat in the next letter than in the previous one. In reality, the vast majority of controls since 2015 have been introduced due to migration, they are just referred to in the letters as “secondary migration flows,” the “threat of smugglers,” or “terrorism.”

Furthermore, two entirely new grounds for reimposing controls were added: the instrumentalization of migration, as used by Belarus on the border with Poland, and health reasons (where COVID served as a precedent). So yes, there is more monitoring and more rules on paper, but in my view, these substantive shifts are far more significant.

Will the “new normal” be an area networked with biometric scanners instead of physical border police?

Technology is certainly crucial, particularly for protecting external borders. Experts and the Commission recommend it as a substitute for reimposing physical internal controls. I am, however, somewhat sceptical about this. I perceive the reintroduction of traditional physical controls primarily as a strong symbolic gesture by politicians towards citizens. They can score political points much more easily with a police officer at a border checkpoint —despite acknowledging its inefficiency—than by explaining how a complex biometric database works. Unfortunately, in my opinion, such visible gestures remain irreplaceable for emphasizing state sovereignty.

“Politicians can score points much more easily with a police officer at a border checkpoint–despite acknowledging its inefficiency–than by explaining how a complex biometric database works.”

Did this research surprise you in any way, or did it rather confirm your expectations?

What intrigued me most were the aforementioned differences in the governments’ argumentation and Denmark’s approach to permanent controls, which is a truly cunning solution. That was what captured my interest the most, even though, after years of researching Schengen, it didn’t entirely surprise me.

Furthermore, the research personally reinforced my disillusionment that Schengen is indeed shifting from a symbol of free movement to a security-oriented project, and I believe there is no turning back. At the same time, I would very much like to be wrong about this.

That’s not a very positive outlook. Is there any proverbial light at the end of the tunnel?

Yes, to end on a positive note: while the mentioned states have maintained controls for over 10 years, the borders remain open and permeable in the vast majority of Schengen states. Moreover, after more than 15 years of negotiations and numerous vetoes, the member states recently agreed to admit Bulgaria and Romania. Scepticism is justified, but one can still view the glass as half full.

Thank you for the interview. For those interested, the full version of the original academic study is freely available here.